The Natzweiler trial: trial of Wolfgang Zeuss, Magnus Wochner, Emil Meier, Peter Straub
In: War Crimes Trials 5
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In: War Crimes Trials 5
In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance - issues and practice, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 371-375
ISSN: 1468-0440
In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance - issues and practice, Band 38, Heft 4, S. 729-752
ISSN: 1468-0440
In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance - issues and practice, Band 38, Heft 4, S. 635-637
ISSN: 1468-0440
In: Netspar Discussion Paper No. 03/2013-063
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In: The Journal of Retirement, Winter 2024, 11 (3) 6-18 DOI: 10.3905/jor.2023.1.150
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In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 7, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
Insurance companies, employer pension plans, and the U.S. government all provide annuities and therefore assume aggregate mortality risk. Using the widely-cited Lee-Carter mortality model, we quantify aggregate mortality risk as the risk that the average annuitant lives longer than is predicted by the model, and we determine that annuities expose providers to substantial risk. We also find that other recent actuarial forecasts lie at the edge or outside of Lee-Carter's 95% confidence interval, suggesting even more uncertainty about future mortality.We then evaluate the implications of aggregate mortality risk for insurance companies; this analysis can be extended to private pension providers and Social Security. Given the forecasts of the Lee-Carter model, we calculate that a markup of 3.9% on an annuity premium (or shareholders' capital equal to 3.9% of the expected present value of annuity payments) would be required to reduce the probability of insolvency resulting from aggregate mortality shocks to 5%, and a markup of 5.7% would reduce the probability of insolvency to 1%. Based on the same model, we find that a projection scale commonly referred to by the insurance industry underestimates aggregate mortality improvements and would leave annuities underpriced.Annuity providers could manage aggregate mortality risk more efficiently by transferring it to financial markets through mortality-contingent bonds. We calculate the returns that one recently proposed mortality bond would have paid had it been available over a long period. Using both the Capital and the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Models, we determine the risk premium that investors would have required to hold the bond. At plausible coefficients of risk aversion, annuity providers should be able to hedge aggregate mortality risk via such bonds at very low cost.
In: NBER Working Paper No. w11984
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w12367
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In: The journal of human resources, Band XL, Heft 2, S. 281-308
ISSN: 1548-8004
In: The review of black political economy: analyzing policy prescriptions designed to reduce inequalities, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 22-37
ISSN: 1936-4814
Increasing the Social Security Full Retirement Age (FRA) adversely affects all workers because an increase is equivalent to an across-the-board cut in benefits. Raising the FRA leaves workers with two bad choices: working longer or living on reduced monthly benefits for the rest of their lives. Working longer further penalizes Blacks and low-wage workers because they are unlikely to live long enough to recoup payments foregone as a result of delayed claiming. Instead of cutting Social Security benefits, retirement policy makers should update and modernize the 401(k) and IRA systems to provide workers with better options.
In: Work, aging and retirement, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 251-261
ISSN: 2054-4650
In: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College WP 2015-19
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